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The present paper focuses on the issue of territorial principle in a bicameral 
system which has remained until today the prevailing element in the develop-
ment of the second chamber of parliament. By presenting its role in the 
Slovenian and comparable legal systems, the paper suggests that the territo-
rial second chamber of parliament is ever more becoming an indispensable 
condition also for unitary states with a high level of decentralisation, blurring 
the distinction between unitary and federal states in such respect. The differ-
ences in the role and position of the second chamber are mainly related to the 
level of decentralisation or development of the local government and, occa-
sionally, to the form of state power. In fact, the weakening of the parlia-
ment's role in relation to the executive also diminishes the role and position 
of the second chamber. Nevertheless, the significance of bicameral decision-
making in theory and in practice remains unchanged. 
 
 







An important element in the development of a bicameral representative 
body ? particularly in the light of the findings and experience from comparable 
legal systems and the tradition or experience of the country concerned ? is the 
form of state organisation to which territorial representation is closely related. 
In the countries governed by a federal system, a bicameral parliament is the 
 Milo{ Sen~ur 
        The bicameral system as a successor to decentralisation 
Uprava, letnik VII, 3/2009 46
conditio sine qua non for the implementation of the federal principle which also 
implies proper representation of territorial units in the federal parliament. Thus, 
what needs to be examined is to what extent internal subdivision affects the 
establishment of the bicameral system based on the territorial principle in the 
case of unitary states, and what is then the role of the second chamber. In 
both cases, the latter should act as a specific mechanism of breaks and bal-
ances in the functioning of the (central) legislature. 
A characteristic of both federal and unitary states is that power is not 
necessarily centralised ? based on the principle of vertical subsidiarity, numer-
ous tasks are transferred into implementation or even management of various 
forms of territorial organisation whose relations with the central government 
are based, in the relevant circumstances, mainly on cooperation and interde-
pendence. Practically any state has, in addition to the central level, also a lower 
level of government represented by a more or less developed and diversified 
local government. This is known as territorial decentralisation.  
The number of levels between the central and local governments de-
pends on the individual country,1 mainly on its size, on historical develop-
ments, and increasingly often on the requirements brought about by the con-
temporary management process.2 As regards the various forms and levels of 
territorial organisation, a process of integration is in place aimed at gathering 
the various elements of the social system under a common framework, as 
appropriate. This by itself points to varying dimensions of the relations be-
tween central government and territorial units, particularly their interactions.  
 
2.? Forms of territorial decentralisation 
 
The shaping of sub-national authorities is a continuous search for the right 
balance between decentralisation and centralisation, and thereby a search for 
new forms of organisation, also on territorial basis. A significant criterion in the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
1 Brezov{ek states that the existence of a network of territorial units is a prerequisite of the 
modern state (Brezov{ek, 1997, p. 188). According to DEXIE, Paris (publication EU Sub-
national governments: an overview) EU Member States comprise 92,500 sub-national com-
munities or authorities (Vlaj, 2009). 
2 If there is only one level of local government, conflicts and polarity arise in the relations 
between the state and the local communities. On the other hand, an excessive number of 
levels normally presents negative consequences for the management process in terms of its 
efficiency.  
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selection of decentralisation measures of structural, financial and other nature 
should be, in particular, the tendency to reasonably eliminate any territorial 
drawbacks or strive for the equality of living conditions of the population at the 
level of a broader state community.3 
In practice, various forms and methods for a top-down transfer of state's 
tasks exist.4 They refer either to the least intense level of transfer ? i.e. decon-
centration or administrative decentralisation5 where the performance of au-
thoritative and other tasks is entrusted with bodies outside the central location, 
mainly owing to functional and organisational needs of the central administra-
tive organisation and population's needs for access to administrative services ? 
or to decentralisation in a stricter sense where transfer also implies the right to 
formulate policies and, partly, self-control over the implementation of the 
tasks.6  
One of the forms and consequences of decentralisation in the manage-
ment of public affairs is local government. The powers of local government are 
provided by the constitution7 which also sets the boundaries of its operation 
and control. Local government is an important method of societal 
(self)regulation8 and at the same time an indivisible part of state organisation.9 
For such reason, the relations between local communities and the state are 
considered an essential element of self-governance. Based on the principle of 
vertical separation of power, this involves reciprocal control in the relations 
with the state and the possibility of local community representation at the cen-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
3 Establishing the right balance in the distribution of public revenue between central gov-
ernment and territorial units to finance their public needs is a problem and hardly resolvable 
issue also in Slovenia. More about the significance of the economic aspect of decentralisa-
tion in Bugari~, 1998, p. 121-130.  
4 Over the last one hundred years, a characteristic of the territorial units in Slovenia is that 
the management of public affairs has been organised at several territorial levels where local 
and state tasks intertwine. Eventually, a single-level public utility system was established as 
an attempt to design the optimal self-governance and authority community in terms of 
achieving balance between the frequency of administrative tasks and the number of popula-
tion and size of the territory.  
5 The term is, for example, explicitly used in Article 5 of the Italian constitution regulating 
the services depending on the state (see: http://www.senato.it/istituzione/29375/ 
articolato.htm, accessed on 2 October 2009).  
6 In such case, theory speaks of political decentralisation as the highest level of autonomy 
(Porta, 2003, p. 207). 
7 Cf. draft Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, Poro~evalec - bulletin of the Assembly of 
the Republic of Slovenia, No. 17/90, p. 20. 
8 Thus, the same territory is managed by two governments, whereby also the state must 
subject to the local government (e.g. in spatial planning). 
9 For example, the state gives local communities guidelines for spatial planning although 
such issue falls in the scope of work of the local government.  
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tral level. It is also the basis to determine the scope of influence of local com-
munities on the regulation of their position and relations with the central  
authority. The higher the level of decentralisation (in political and economic 
terms), the more attention is devoted to issues relating to the separation of 
power between the state's centre and its parts, and those relating to the im-
pact the latter should have on the shaping of central bodies and the decisions 
they make. The level of decentralisation is also directly proportional to the 
need for adequate interconnection between the system and its parts, which 
often results in the form of a bicameral structure of the central authority. 
However, the bicameral system is not the only form of separation of state 
powers, and the principle of horizontal separation of power is not the only as-
pect of bicameralism. In fact, political or social power is not distributed just 
horizontally in the classical sense, but also vertically. The principle of the verti-
cal separation of power is indeed gaining importance since a considerable 
share of power should be held by the local government.10 The holders of such 
power have, given their self-governing position, at the same time the right to 
present their views and participate in the resolution of issues relating to the 
exercise of local government.11 
?
3.? Conceptual bases and practices of territorial 
representation in comparable countries 
 
The oldest ? and in a certain sense considered as reference ? second 
chamber is the United States Senate,12 established as early as 1787. Contrary 
to most other chambers the Senate has, to date, undergone no significant 
changes in terms of equality with the Congress' House of Representatives. 
Originally, the Senate had been designed as representative of the federal units 
although here, too, the interests of political parties later (mainly following the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
10 Cf. Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia No. U-I-176/04 (Offi-
cial Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia No. 21/06). 
11 Cf. Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia No. U-I-24/07 (Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia No. 101/07). 
12 A model to numerous federations. For example, at the Melbourne conference of 1890 the 
delegates from all Australian colonies decided for a future federal organisation of the coun-
try with a bicameral central parliament (more at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/, ac-
cessed on 2 October 2009). 
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introduction of direct elections) prevailed over the interests of individual 
states.13  
The U.S. model was followed by the Swiss constitution of 1848 introducing a 
bicameral federal legislature.14 According to the existing constitutional system 
(constitution of 1999), the Federal Assembly is composed by the National 
Council and the Council of States. The power and freedom of the Swiss can-
tons has reflected in the role and position of the second chamber, except dur-
ing the relatively short existence of a unitary state. In terms of powers, the 
second chamber has been equal to the first and the cantons have been al-
lowed to autonomously define the manner in which it would be structured.15 
The importance of the upper chamber diminishes in the event of joint sessions 
where the numerical advantage of the first chamber comes to the fore. Its role 
as protector of the cantons' interests is further reduced in the event of a refer-
endum where such role is entrusted to the people. Nevertheless, over the last 
decades Switzerland has been characterised by centralisation affecting its 
transformation into a group of unitary states.16 
Germany introduced a federal type of government with the constitution of 
1871 although the legislative power was mainly in the hands of the central 
authority, weakening the role and position of the federal units.17 Later on, the 
Weimar constitution restricted also the powers of the second chamber, and 
the prevailing opinion today is that Germany was then close to a decentralised 
unitary state.18 Following the rise of Hitler to power, the second chamber and 
the Länder were abolished in 1934.19 In the post-war period, both German states 
had bicameral parliaments and both upper chambers were representatives of territo-
rial units.20 With the German reunification in 1990, the constitution of West Ger-
many prevailed. The Federal Council (Bundesrat) is subordinate to the first cham-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
13 Grad et al., 2004, p. 143. 
14 Brli}, 1931, p. 467. 
15 In the past the representatives of the states were occasionally elected by the states' as-
semblies; today, they are elected directly. The cantons' regulations also provide for a uni-
form duration of their term of office (data from: http://www.ipu.org/english/home.htm, ac-
cessed on 2 October 2009). 
16 Trifunovska, 1991, p. 138. On the other hand, there are signs of decentralisation resulting 
in the enhanced vertical integration among the cantons and local government units 
(Zimmermann, 1993, p. 86).  
17 The then federal state was often named pseudo-federalism (Beyme, 2002, p. 307). 
18 Grad et al., 2004, p. 91. 
19 Ibid. 
20 The representatives of the second chamber of East Germany were elected by the assem-
blies of these units, yet their decisions were not binding. The Länder were abolished in 1952 
and the country became a unitary state (Grad et al., 2004, p. 108). 
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ber.21 It has the right to absolute veto on certain laws,22 and to suspensive veto on 
all other legislation.23 The members of the Federal Council are elected by the 
state governments from among their members 24 and have an imperative term 
meaning that they must follow the instructions of their state governments.25   
The 1920 constitution of Austria, pursuant to which the second chamber 
reflected the federal organisation of the state, was amended twice (in 1925 
and 1929), whereby the 1929 amendment expanded the second chamber to 
also include professions.26 Such change to the structure of the second cham-
ber was radically upgraded with the new constitution of 1934 when the sec-
ond chamber completely lost its role of representative of territorial units. The 
constitutional act of 1945 re-established the original constitution and returned 
to the second chamber powers similar to those originally provided. In such 
context, in addition to the right to legislative initiative and suspensive veto, 
mention needs to be made of the right to consensus to the decisions of the 
first chamber in specific cases.27  
The Spanish autonomous communities are sometimes compared with the 
German Länder, ranking Spain among highly decentralised and almost federal 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
21 According to von Beyme, the Bundesrat is not a second chamber. It has a rather semi-
parliamentarian character shown by the fact that the public takes no interest in its work, that 
its members vote unitarily as a delegation, that control over the government is indirect, etc. 
(Beyme, 2002, p. 310). At some point the author concludes that the Bundesrat has – contrary 
to the expectations of the authors of the constitution – developed into a strong second 
chamber (p. 316), which is of course closer to the actual situation (Russell, 2000, p. 216-218). 
22 This is useful mainly in the event of amendments to the constitution, laws affecting pub-
lic finance, and those affecting the states’ administrative jurisdiction (more at: 
http://www.bundestag.de, accessed on 2 October 2009). 
23 Pursuant to Article 50 of the German constitution, the Länder participate through the 
Bundesrat in the legislation and administration of the Federation and in matters concerning 
the European Union (see: http://www.bundestag.de/gesetze/gg/, accessed on 2 October 
2009).   
24 From three to six representatives, depending on the number of inhabitants in the indi-
vidual federal state. The term of office of the members of the Bundesrat is not fixed – they 
are appointed and removed by the state governments (data retrieved from: 
http://www.ipu.org/english/home.htm, accessed on 2 October 2009). 
25 According to theoreticians, the Bundesrat is a unique and most successful second cham-
ber in terms of territorial representation. It has no party groups and the positions of its 
members often influence the parties' policies. The second chamber provides a mechanism 
of control over federal legislation, while its potential force to block such legislation creates a 
system of interconnection and mutual influence between the federation and the states (Rus-
sell, 2001b, p. 114 and 115). 
26 The amendment was a result of the requests for true democracy made by political parties 
(Polzer-Srienz, 2000, p. 27).  
27 Theory described such status of the second chamber as a false bicameral system, where 
the already insignificant representation of federal units’ interests at the federal level is in-
creasing with the predominance of party interests (Koja, 1970, p. 259). 
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countries.28 In the Spanish Senate, most members are directly elected within terri-
torial units while other members are elected by their representative bodies. For 
such reason the Senate is often regarded as an unusual second chamber where 
directly elected members have no natural links with the local authorities al-
though they are mostly also members of autonomous communities' legisla-
tures.29  
Likewise, most of the many constitutional systems of France considered 
territorial representation to be an essential part of any parliament. During the 
Third Republic, the Senate represented the communes as the oldest and most 
important social groups, and the two chambers had, in principle, equal powers 
in the legislative procedure.30 The Fourth Republic significantly restricted the 
powers of the second chamber, while the 1958 constitution of the Fifth Re-
public (still applicable today) provides that territorial units must be represented 
in parliament.31 According to theoreticians, the involvement of local interests at 
the state level implies a similar representation as the one established in feder-
ally and regionally organised countries, giving the local authorities great possi-
bilities to influence decisions at higher levels (the Senate is actually the council 
of the French communes).32  
The Italian Senate is constitutionally shaped on a regional basis.33 It would 
therefore be expected that it mainly acts as representative of the regions yet 
such role of the Senate and the importance of the regions in the system of 
bicameralism are diminished through the influence of political parties.34 One of 
the proposals to reform the constitutional system in Italy was for the Senate to 
have less members elected by representatives of municipal, provincial and 
regional councils, while general legislative power would be held exclusively by 
the lower house.35  
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
28 [midovnik, 1993, p. 203. 
29 Russell, 2001b, p. 211. 
30 A similar system of election to Senate applied in Sweden where the members of the 
upper house were elected by representative bodies of the provinces and the delegates of the 
cities that were not represented in provincial representative bodies (Stefanovi}, 1931, p. 
540). 
31  Cf. Article 24 of the constitution (http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/ 
constitution.asp, accessed on 2 October 2009). 
32 Meny, 1998, p. 117. 
33 The Italian system recognises four levels of authority. The regions may autonomously 
adopt laws related to several areas and also hold legislative initiative 
(http://www.senato.it/istituzione/29375/articolato.htm, accessed on 2 October 2009).  
34 As a rule, the representatives of both chambers gather in parliamentary groups by party 
affiliation (Osnove, 1998, p. 70). 
35 Klari}, 2005, p. 177 and 178. 
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As seen above, the prevailing and most common method for the devel-
opment of the second chamber of parliament today is regional basis36, serving 
as a model for the modern state.37 In federal countries, the reasons for a bi-
cameral system are practically the same and consider bicameralism a neces-
sary consequence of such type of state organisation. With some rare excep-
tions, all federations have bicameral parliaments,38 the second chamber acting 
as representative of the federal units.39 In unitary countries, the structure of 
parliament mainly depends on the level of the country's decentralisation and 
development of its local government. The importance of territorial representa-
tion varies. 
In the countries governed by bicameral systems where territorial repre-
sentation plays an important role, significant differences are observed in the 
role and position of the second chamber owing to different historical develop-
ment and social changes in individual countries,40 particularly in economics and 
politics (e.g. creation of political parties and strengthening of their role),41  
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
36 Territorial representation is in fact the prime component of the modern bicameral par-
liament, and also the English model of bicameralism originally derived from the territorial 
principle.  
37 E.g. in late March 2009, Ukraine submitted into parliamentary procedure a new draft 
constitution providing for the introduction of a bicameral parliament. The Ukrainian presi-
dent chose such option based on the example of other countries with established bicameral 
systems. The parliament would thus gather representatives of political forces in the lower 
house, elected directly according to a proportional system, and representatives of local 
communities (regions), entering the upper house directly based on a majority electoral sys-
tem under the principle of parity (Ju{~enko, 2009, p. 5). Similarly, the Serbian constitutional 
law theory states that regionalisation of the country would also reflect in the structure of 
parliament, although unicameral (Peji}, 2005, p. 80). 
38 E.g. Saint Kitts & Nevis, Micronesia and Venezuela (Massicote, 2001, p. 152). 
39 The bicameral system is sometimes characteristic also of the federal units. Australia for 
example only has one exception - Queensland, where the second chamber was abolished 
already in 1922. More in Abolition of the Upper House, Information on Parliament and Gov-
ernment in Queensland, p. 1-11 (website: http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au./, accessed on 2 
October 2009), stating that a unicameral parliament is a deviation from democracy while a 
bicameral system is what every governance needs. Such statement is understandable since 
bicameral parliaments based on the English model persisted in the Australian federal units 
even in the time of the colonies status, mostly for the same reasons as those typical of uni-
tary states, i.e. for serving as brake and balance of the legislature. 
40 A typical example is France where in the 200 years of history of bicameral parliament (or 
even multicameral in a certain period of time) its second chamber experienced several trans-
formations both in terms of composition and powers. Quite similar was the situation in 
former federal Yugoslavia where social changes explicitly reflected in the organisational 
changes of representative bodies at all levels of power. 
41 For example, the US Senate in its role of representative of the interests of the ownership 
structures of financial, commercial and large estates nature has often supported regulations 
strengthening the power of the federation on the account of the states; therefore, today's 
discussions about its role and the need for its further existence are similar as in unitary 
countries with bicameral systems (Hague et al., 2001, p. 275). Already Laski believed that the 
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distinctions in terms of equality of territorial units,42 varying possibilities of terri-
torial units' participation in and influence on decision-making at the central 
level,43 federalisation processes,44 centralisation and decentralisation over dif-
ferent periods,45 new patterns of public affairs management, etc.  
On the other hand, these countries have numerous points in common 
which are rooted, among other, in the form of their state organisation or state 
authority. The prevailing conviction is that the second chamber in the legisla-
tures of federal countries has a more important role than the second chamber 
in unitary countries. This is, given the grounds for its existence, a justified sup-
position although not sufficiently confirmed by practice. Obviously, the form of 
state organisation is important46 and to some extent affects the role and posi-
tion of the second chamber.47  
It may well be said that where the parliament as a system is losing impor-
tance or where the separation of power is less consistent, also the role of the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
principle of representation of territorial units in the U.S. Senate was outwitted by the activity 
of the party system since the republicans in the Senate and those in the House of Represen-
tatives always vote the same (Laski, 1934-35, p. 60). 
42 As a rule, all territorial units in the second chamber of the federal parliament have the 
same number of representatives irrespective of the unit's size and population (Peji}, 2005, p. 
78). Yet since the role of the territorial element is in practice disguised by party politics and 
party loyalty, theoreticians (Russell, 2003, p. 313) believe that it is more important for the 
dynamics of the second chamber that no political party has excessive majority in the second 
chamber than that all territorial units are represented therein on a parity basis. 
43 In some federal countries, these possibilities are not available merely within the frame-
work of activities of the second chamber but also in other ways (e.g. the decisions of the 
federal parliament must be approved by a certain number of federal units or their parlia-
ments, such as in Switzerland, Canada, and similarly in former Yugoslavia). Pursuant to the 
constitution of 1793, the French unicameral parliament had to forward the adopted laws to 
all communes in the country to obtain their opinion (if a tenth of the communes from most 
departments opposed a law, the parliament had to convene what was known as primary 
assemblies for the law to be finally adopted). Thus, the territorial communities of France had 
a role similar to those in bicameral systems. On the other hand, there are cases such as the 
Canadian parliament where members of the Senate are appointed by the federal govern-
ment, thus questioning the role of the second chamber as representative of federal units.  
44 Belgium was a unitary and centralised state for a long time, but since 1970 gradually 
pursued decentralisation and federalism to officially become a federal country in 1993 (Li-
jphart, 1999, p. 100). Belgium is an example showing that the boundaries between federal in 
regional assembly may also be blurred (Ribi~i~, 2000, p. 56). 
45 This is a constant process of redistribution of tasks between the central government and 
the territorial units in order to strengthen the one or the others. 
46 Canada, Germany and Austria are characterised by a subordinate role of the second 
chamber although these countries have a federal system, yet have at the same time a par-
liamentary form of power (a partial exception in this group of countries is Australia, but also 
there the second chamber has a minor role when it comes to relations with the government 
or adoption of finance-related laws ).  
47 In federal countries with an assembly system (e.g., Switzerland and the former socialist 
countries), with a presidential system (e.g. USA), or with prevailing elements of the presi-
dential system (e.g. Russia), the role of the second chamber in parliament is more equal.  
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second chamber is diminishing.48 A specific example in such regard is the Ital-
ian system: Italy is a unitary country and a parliamentary republic, and never-
theless the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies are fully equal. Yet the Italian 
case presents several important circumstances which somewhat explain this 
peculiarity. For example, the president ? although indirectly elected ? has a 
greater role and a stronger position than in other parliamentary systems, in-
cluding Slovenia.49 Moreover, despite its unitary organisation, Italy features a 
strong regional component50 also reflected in the frequent requests for feder-
alisation. 
 
4.? Territorial representation in the development of 
Slovenian bicameralism 
 
Slovenians and the rest of Europe alike have been experiencing different 
structures and forms of representative bodies over different periods of time 
and through various systems of state organisation. The bicameral structure of 
parliament found many advocates even in older theories.51 In practice, how-
ever, the decisions were the result of the distribution of power among various 
social groups. Particularly in the case of former Yugoslavia, the dynamics of 
social relations clearly reflected in numerous changes in the structure of the 
federal and republic representative bodies.52 The fil rouge of such changes was 
also a series of debates on the importance of territorial representation in the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
48 An argument in favour of bicameralism is that the various interests represented in the 
second chamber are less influenced by the government than in the lower house (Russell, 
2001a, p. 442). 
49 Longer term of office of the president, the right to form the government, the appointment 
of senior state officials, the approval of draft laws submitted by the government to the par-
liament, convening extraordinary sessions of any parliamentary chamber, the right to dis-
miss them, supervision over the implementation of the legislative function in the form of 
suspensive veto, are all characteristics testifying to the relatively strong role of the Italian 
president. 
50 The regions have legislative powers in certain areas, the right to legislative initiative, 
they may request the calling of an abrogating popular referendum; in addition, based on the 
subsidiarity principle, the central government transferred a series of administrative tasks 
onto regional governments, provinces and municipalities (Klari}, 2005, p. 174 and 175).  
51 Vo{njak, 1920, p. 198-203 in Steska, 1920, p. 1-20. Vo{njak believed that the upper house 
should represent all socio-economic players in the country, while Steska argued that the 
participation of territorial autonomous representations in legislation acted as counter-
balance to overhasty decisions of the parliament.  
52 For a thorough overview of this period see Kristan, 1970, p. 184 and 185. 
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legislature.53 In Slovenia, the debates about finding the most suitable form of 
municipal participation in the formulation of republic policies or municipal influ-
ence on the work of the republic assembly and on a more consistent imple-
mentation of the principle of bicameralism, first resulted in the introduction of 
the meeting of municipal delegates as a consultative body of the republic as-
sembly, and later on in the establishment of the Chamber of Municipalities as 
an equal chamber of the  Assembly.54 
The structure of parliament occupied also the thoughts of the authors of 
the new Slovenian constitution,55 particularly in relation to the structure of the 
future local government. No particular disagreement was expressed in relation 
to the basic local communities but questions were raised regarding the estab-
lishment of broader local communities and their representation at the state 
level. The opinions thereon were diametrically opposed. Some people believed 
regions to be unnecessary since the process of regionalisation would at the 
same time imply a tendency toward the federalisation of the state, while oth-
ers thought that without establishing the second level the local government 
could not be developed, which would negatively affect also the promotion of 
territorial interests in the formulation of state policies. The latter also cautioned 
that a large number of small and technically weak municipalities and the ab-
sence of the second level of local government would lead to an excessive gap 
in the relation toward the centres of power at the state level.56   
Over the various stages of drafting the new Slovenian constitution, the 
National Council as representative of special interests (local, social, profes-
sional, etc.) has always been considered an alternative solution in the future 
structure of parliament, but has not received adequate attention. For such rea-
son, its role and position have been rather undefined ever since its establish-
ment. This applies in particular to the representation of territorial interests 
which have the absolute majority in the Council.57 Thus, the dilemma faced by 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
53 Session records of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, No. 38/68, Appen-
dices, p. 472. 
54 Already the debates on the draft constitution stressed that in the republic assembly ade-
quate attention should be given to the diversity of municipal interests in all matters which 
directly affect the interests of the citizens and the position, role and tasks of the municipality 
as territorial community (Cf. Session records of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of 
Slovenia, 61st session of the Chamber of the Republic, 18 July 1973, p. 115). 
55 Cf. verbatim records of the debate at the 18th session of the Commission for Constitu-
tional Affairs of the Slovenian Assembly of 12 December 1990.      
56 Cf. Ribi~i~, 2007, p. 331.  
57 This may be regarded as anachronism since the National Council was established al-
ready at the time of "municipal communes". 
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the authors of the constitution about which type of second chamber should be 
chosen in order to satisfy the tasks of territorial representation and have a 
positive influence on the legislative activity or social management processes, 
is still very topical. Also owing to the inconsistent implementation of the prin-
ciple of vertical separation of power. 
The constitutional amendments of 2006 made the two-stage local gov-
ernment compulsory. The intermediate level between the state and the mu-
nicipalities would be represented by the regions as broader self-governing local 
communities. This would provide the second chamber of the Slovenian parlia-
ment with a more prominent role (either as chamber of the regions or a struc-
turally reformed National Council58), on condition of a simultaneous considera-
tion of the suitability of its existing powers. Several possibilities are to be ex-
amined, from the creation of a strong second chamber, which might even lead 
to subordination of the first chamber, to the establishment of a second cham-
ber which would in practice qualify as inefficient and unnecessary. The right 
solution is usually a compromise, which however is only justified if it meets 
certain criteria (such as powers decisive for the legislative procedure, adequate 
influence in the relation toward the executive, etc.).  
In terms of development, the solutions regarding the future role and posi-
tion of the National Council should be directed toward: 
?? a change in the relation between the National Council and the National 
Assembly as the general representative body, or improved competi-
tiveness of the National Council with adequate redefinition and modi-
fication of its powers; and 
?? a change in its internal structure (partly or entirely), whereby the trans-
formation of the National Council's structure depends on the future 




58 The most interesting, broad, and intense public debate on the possibilities to transform 
the National Council into a territorial representation or representation of the future regions 
was held as early as 1998 when both the advantages and disadvantages of possible modifi-
cations were presented (see e.g. Grad, 1998, p. 168-172 and Kristan, 1998, p. 173-174); the 
debate became even more topical following the most recent constitutional amendments 
(more in Ribi~i~, 2007, p. 336-339). 
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5.? Conclusion 
?
In most federal countries with bicameral parliaments, the second chamber 
is established based on the territorial principle. The latter is ever more becom-
ing an indispensable condition also for unitary states with well-developed local 
government, slowly blurring the differences between them and the federal 
countries. A contribution to gradual equalisation is made also by political par-
ties whose interests often prevail over the interests of other social groups. 
The past experience and the comparisons with other countries provide 
useful guidelines for future decisions. Some of the existing solutions, an ex-
ample thereof certainly being the constitutional definition of the National 
Council, have largely been adopted without due consideration, which results in 
increasing headache anytime the assessment of the existing and future role or 
even abolishment of the National Council appears on the political menu. 
The interconnection between local and central governments and the need 
for their cooperation and coordination call for more adequate institutional forms 
also in Slovenia. Local interests are represented in the National Council, which 
means that local government is one of the structural elements of the parlia-
ment. In addition to political interests mainly pursued by political parties, the 
parliament should reflect the interests of self-governing territorial units. The 
National Council thus represents at least a possibility to prevent the absolute 
monopoly and arbitrariness of the general representative body which may oth-
erwise freely create legislation to fit its own interests or the interests of politi-
cal elites. Such possibility is, however, only feasible where the second cham-
ber has powers and competences broad enough to make it more equal to the 
first chamber. This mainly refers to a significant and sometimes even decisive 
role in the legislative process, in the process of constitutional review, in finan-
cial matters, and in the relation toward the executive. If one of the main weap-
ons of the second chamber is suspensive veto whereby it only temporarily 
suspends the entry into force of a law, then it will hardly meet the expecta-
tions ? be it a pragmatic promotion of the interests of territorial units or the 
implementation of democratic standards within the legislative branch. Both 
cases result in a democratic deficit of public administration, which only differs 
in terms of its dimension. 
?
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